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The RLS Mandala
provides merely a lens through which the people's livelihoods
of Kanakanala Watershed were assessed, after three weeks in
the field. The other approaches were used to assess home-shopping
and MUNJAVU's other interventions. Of course, one month is
too short for a newcomer in the field of social sciences to
provide a full livelihood assessment. The authors' understanding
of livelihood research changed drastically once the world
of the villagers was entered. On one hand it started to make
immense sense to work where SAMUHA works, while on the other
hand it was realized how difficult it is to plan and implement
a livelihood intervention. In villages without proper infrastructure
like toilets, water, roads and houses and even without food
security, a livelihood intervention asks for basic livelihood
security first. Where was that security? The boundary between
(immediate) relief and (long-term) development blurred.
If any findings of this report stimulate a debate, then the
aims are met. However, the study objectives are repeated here,
with answers, remarks and more open questions. If these
conclusions sound very critical, they are not meant to discredit
MUNJAVU/SAMUHA's efforts. This organisation does admirable
efforts, and they are open enough to listen to criticism.
Opinions on relation & dimension of poverty reduction
(individual, household, village, watershed, state, country
)
may vary, but SAMUHA definitely improves the lives of many
people in Kanakanala watershed. These efforts and achievements
are acknowledged here! The organisation is an important bridge
between the people of the area and the larger structures and
policies surrounding and influencing them (Government, environment,
economy, rich urban society).
Which forces
and factors shape a livelihood household strategy in the Kanakanala
watershed?
The assumption that the overriding concern of farmers or rural
inhabitants is assuring sustainable livelihood, and not necessarily
sustainable use of resources, may be correct. But still,
often farmers are left with no other options than applying
strategies which are short-term oriented in order to meet
their household needs. And this often results in unsustainable
approaches. The farmers will be the first to change that for
the better, if there is any possibility to do so. Intra- or
inter-village conflicts or a conflicting attitude between
farmers and development organisation are on the increase.
The groundwater issue is a classical example of a "tragedy
of the commons" where an "open-access regime"
brings short-term benefit to few and disaster for all in the
long term. Only information dissemination and a regime involving
all stakeholders can bring relief.
In any case, there
is no way to deliver answers in such a quick assessment. But
hopefully some cases, stories, portraits and issues were brought
out, which help the field staff to focus on what we don't
know. It is considered an absolute necessity to keep searching
for answers to this fundamental question. Unfortunately the
field teams find very little space and time to work on that
process driven, learning oriented line. Mostly, the NGO's
are forced to work target-driven: SDC/IC and PSMU put quite
some pressure on monitoring issues: Meet deadlines, produce
reports (action plans, progress reports, meeting minutes),
hold meetings (JPR etc.). The good intentions not to be
target driven can be undermined by a too demanding monitoring
and compliance system, which does not promote self-reflection,
self-evaluation and debates enough. If space and time for
more exchange of views and debates were allowed, inside the
partners and between the partners, there could be more room
for learnings, and thus room to take steps backwards, if it
is felt the course of action is not going in a satisfactory
way. In CARE's livelihood paper the aim to become a true learning
organization is pointed out:
| A learning
process approach is appropriate for most areas of human
activity. It presumes that neither the ends nor the means
of social interventions can be fully known in advance,
and that through understanding and consensus on them must
be built up through practical experience. Mistakes are
unavoidable and some failures are bound to occur, but
with ongoing evaluation, results can be improved. programmes
that seek to promote learning must 'embrace error', modifying
actions so that ultimately they meet socially defined
objectives. This can be a rocky road, but it is a preferable
one (Uphoff 1992).
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How
can the project partners improve the livelihood intervention
in order to achieve more sustainable livelihood systems?
The SWOT analysis in the previous chapter gives some recommendations
on home-shopping. The participants of home-shopping are benefiting,
there is no doubt. And the field observations confirmed that
the women involved increase not only their income, but also
their knowledge and skills, their self-awareness and self-consciousness.
Thus one of the aims of home-shopping is met, but looking
carefully who these women are, reveals that these outspoken,
dynamic women would probably manage to move upwards on a social
and economic scale without MUNJAVU's support. There are other
women who are in more desperate need of support. These have
to be identified first of all!
Assessing the
interventions / livelihood approaches from an angle of poverty
reduction: How can the marginalized groups be identified and
encouraged to participate in such livelihood interventions?
Once the author sat in the most remote hamlets, talking to
the most marginalized women it became clear how difficult
it is to organize such women. Even more difficult it is to
design an intervention where they could take part. Generally
the inner realities of these people were as troubled as their
economic situation. Some will not speak at all. The poorer
they were, the more social and physical problems were met
with (domestic violence, alcohol etc.). The author has no
answer to "how they could be involved". Home-shopping
embedded in SAMUHA's strategy as a whole seems an interesting
intervention after all, and the next phases of the intervention
will show whether the attempts to include more local women
in the scheme proves profitable even for marginalized women.
At the same time, identifying the vulnerable groups and quantifying
them in defined categories would be a helpful exercise for
any future or ongoing livelihood intervention. This challenge
is considered most important to have real impacts on poverty
reduction as the author understands it, and a debate on this
issue should be started on all fronts in ISPWDK. [KAWAD has
documented their experiences in this regard in various publications,
see reference list]
Which reason
/ logic prevents women / men from becoming SHG members?
The obvious reasons stated by all interviewed were economical
("how can we save, we do not even find labour!")
and migration-related ("how can we attend meetings?")
or a lack of awareness ("we don't know what they do.
How should we know?"). In order to dig deeper into these
reasons, some more research would be necessary. In group interviews
it was not possible to look into household and family dynamics
of non SHG women. MUNJAVU could keep the issue in mind and
maybe there will be an opportunity to focus more on this important
matter. This report hopefully outlines the tools, how such
assessments could be attempted. Participatory Rural Appraisal
(PRA) exercises were done in the past too and have not delivered
any solid answers either, as it seems. Besides, would a more
important aim than including more women in SHG not
be to involve the existing SHG's more in village development?
As to what prevents men, some claimed they were simply never
asked, and it seems MUNJAVU does not consider men SHG's an
option.
Which reasons
prevents women / men from participating in the livelihood
activities?
First of all, the dynamics of exclusion are not properly assessed
in this study, thus answers here would be in the wrong place.
But some issues arose nevertheless: Are there even enough
opportunities to promote a diversity of activities? How many
women can actually be included in an intervention? There is
a limit of every activity, per small village there can only
be one tailor, one carpenter, one blacksmith, one tea stall
etc. The remotest villages find it difficult to sustain any
activity at all. Thus is micro-enterprise promotion a
viable strategy to include the most marginalized in these
areas under given circumstances? What would have to change
in order to become that? In this regard, the context
of people's livelihoods, as explained best in DFID's or CARE's
livelihood models, (policies, structures, institutions, infrastructure
etc) probably has to change. There are simply limits of small
enterprise development.
Other than that,
all the participating women were found to be very active
and dynamic. After talking to various women taking up
other livelihood activities on their own (tea stall, Kirani
shop, bangles business, laundry etc.) a simple truth became
obvious: Shy, quiet women with low degree of freedom in their
houses and with low decision-making power never venture into
any new activities which might be risky or demanding and require
support from their families. Thus not only a lack of money,
but also a lack of support, power and self-confidence is crucial
in who comes forward and who stays back. This may sound simple,
and most claim of knowing this already, but curiously the
answer did not come from NGO staff or village women. To derive
a direct strategy or livelihood intervention from this is
impossible, but indirectly women's education, empowerment
and capacity building in any regard changes this situation
slowly but surely.
ISPWDK does not
implement a livelihood approach as such, only a livelihood
intervention with the aim to generate income. The differences
between these two are outlined in the previous Chapter 7.
The BASIX mandate covers support for this intervention. They
assist SAMUHA in setting up the best possible design and give
support on technical and financial issues. The BASIX livelihoods
definition does mention sustainable livelihoods as their aim.
But in the current intervention this outcome is assumed:
how that happens is not defined in their work with ISPWDK.
BASIX does not present itself as an organisation using a livelihood
approach with all the social aspects. They assume the NGO's
and agencies they work with have this "social" competence
themselves. Thus BASIX fulfills their mandate, their inputs
are solid and professional. However, ISPWDK can not expect
that these interventions reach the marginalized. Such an approach
should be defined and planned on a project level, and capacity
of staff should be built before any intervention. The
experience of other agencies shows that a successful intervention
only grows once the staff is fully aware of the livelihoods
approach. Poverty, marginalization, livelihoods, livelihoods
strategies etc. are terms which have to be defined and understood
thoroughly. "Watershed Development" and "Livelihood
Approach" are two different pairs of shoes. It was
ambitious to reconcile the aims of the two in one project.
Nevertheless it was worth the effort. Any future activity
will definitely take the issues raised during phase II of
ISPWDK into consideration. The debates are in full swing at
the moment, thus it was an exciting project stage to be involved
in!
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